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')F ITTAH,

Plaintiff-Resp::indent,
'JS.

Case No. 19,021

'nCTOR ONTIVEROS,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELIANI'

srA.."'EMENI' OF 'IRE NA'I'IIBE OF 'IRE CASE

Defendant was charged with Distribution of a Controlled Substance for
Value, in that on or about the 10th day of June, 1982, in violation of
58-39-8(1) (a) (ii), the Defendant did distribute for value a controlled
substance, to wit:

marijuana.
DISPOSITION IN IDWER O'.JURI'

Defendant was tried by jury in the Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah

County, the Honorable DAVID SAM, JUDGE, presiding, on the 12th day of

January, 1983.

The jury found the Defendant guilty as charged.

The Court had

previously ruled on December 1, 1982, that Defendant was not entrapped as a
matter of law.

The Court also denied Defendant's l'btion for Directed Verdict of

l\cRJital on the 18th day of January, 1983.
Defendant was sentence<l on the 24th day of February, 1983, to serve 0-5
'e>ars in the Utah State Prison, but the sentence was stayed and Defendant granted
orobat ion.

RELIEF SOUGl'T' ON APPEAL
Appellant respectful l·.1 requests that the Court r"'vrorc;0 the 'leulict , 1 r
guilty entered in the District Court.
STATDlEITT OF FACTS

Approximately two weeks prior to the 10th of ,)une, 1982, the Defendant
was contacted by a Provo City undercover police officer at his hane in Springville, Utah.

The police officer was accanpanied by an acquaintance of the

Defendant named Billy and had not previously had any contact with the Defendant.
The officer had no prior knowledge that Defendant was a drug dealer or involved
in drugs. ('l'R 16, 28, 36)

The purpose for the police officers interest in the

Defendant was to purchase drugs fran the Defendant.

The undercover officer was

told by the Defendant that he had no drugs and that he didn't sell drugs. Z\t that
time the officer gave the Defendant a business card with his undercover name and

two numbers.

He indicated that he was a taxi cab driver and he coulci be reached

at one of the numbers on the card should the Defendant have any cirugs he wanted
to sell. (TR 37) Following the initial contact with the Defendant, tJie undercover
officer followed up with two phone calls to the Defendant's hane and three or
four visits to his apartment each lasting fran twenty to forty minutes on which
occasions the Defendant was asked to procure drugs for the officer.

On each of

those occasions, with the exception of the last, the Defendant infmmed the
officer that he didn't have any drugs and he didn't sell drugs.

(TR 38-40)

The

Defendant's wife was present during part of the conversations on those occasions
when the police officer was at the hane of the Defendant anci Mrs. Ontiveros ·.;as
also the individual who answered the phone on both occasions when the officer
called. (TR 52-55)

At no time during the time period between the initial contar'

'""'n
1,1 ,

1

1

L'il'

undercover [X)l ice officer and the Defendant and the date of June 10,

rJ u1 the Defl'n'1ant ever contact the officer either by telephone or

"'twise>.

All contact between Defendant and the undercover police officer was

i11iti3ted by the officer.

(TR 30-31, 38)

On the 10th of June, the undercover

officer came to the Defendant's hane in Springville, without any prior
in11itation, and asked if the Defendant had any drugs to sell.

The Defendant had

sane canpany at hane since the 10th was his son's birthday and asked the officer
to cane back later.

When the officer returned he was invited in and Defendant

indicated that he still did not have any drugs but that he knew saneone who might
have sane marijuana for sale.

Defendant indicated that he offered to find sane

drugs for the undercover officer "rrore or less to get him out of my hair". (TR
41) The Defendant made a phone call and indicated to the officer that the third
party was willing to sell him a half an ounce of marijuana for forty ($40.00)
r:x:illars.

The Defendant took the officer to the location, received forty dollars

fran the officer, went into an apartment, brought out one-half ounce of marijuana
and delivered it to the officer.

(TR 20-22, TR 42)

the Defendant received any rroney for himself.

There was no evidence that

(TR 28)

After the marijuana had been exchanged, and on the Wi!r'f back to
Springville, the parties srroked a joint of marijuana fran the baggie.

On their

arrival at Springville, the Defendant requested the officer to sell him enough
marijuana for one joint out of the baggie.

The officer declined to sell him any

'llarijuana but did agree to let him take enough out of the bag for one joint.

(TR

il, 42-43) After the sell which occured on the 10th of June, 1982, there were no

'the>t contacts between the officer or the Defendant until the Defendant was
arrested on this charge.

(TR 43-42)
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At the close of the StatP's case, the ))pfen1ant male>

J

:nnt i•'n c,,r

directed verdict based on the argument that thc> Defendant 'lad not: cudc>
bution of a controlled substance frx value. (TR 62)

3

1

11 , 1

1

The rmti,,n was leniecl h·,, "

Court.
.a.RGUMENI'
POINr I

'IBE DEFENDANT' WAS ENl'RAPPED BY 'ffiE UNDERCDVER OFFICER.
The Defendant raised the issue of entraµnent both prior to trial in an
evidenciary hearing on motion in ccrnpliance with Utah Code Annotated 76-2-303,
1953 as amended, and at the time of trial.

'l'he Court found there was no

entrapnent as a matter of law at the time of the evidenciary hearing.
The present case before the Court, is substantially similar to the
situation which existed in a previous case decided by this Court in State
vs. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238.

In Kourbelas, the Defendant was engaged in a

conversation with an undercover agent who first suggested the purchase of marijuana from the Defendant, then followed the initial contact with a renewed
contact and request with approximately five telephone calls to purchase marijuana.

There was no evidence that the Defendant had previously possessed or

dealt in the drug prior to the contacts by the officer.

The conviction of

Kourbelas was reversed, the Court finding there was reasonable doubt as to
whether or not the offense camli tted was a product of the Defendant's initiative
and desire or was induced by the persistent request of the undercover officer.
In the present case, there was no evidence that the Defendant had an/
prior history of dealing drugs or any evidence that he had even possessed "lruqs
prior to the officers contact.

'1'he officer, after the initial contact,

-4-

,,,

' '

11 1P

thP Defenc1ant to sell him drugs although the Defendant never at any

"' trJr to the date of the transaction agreed to do so.
1

rJ<Of Pnrlant had been furnished

bo.Q

l\dditonally, although

telephone numbers where the officer could be

,'"ntcicted anrl, in a<ldition, having been infonned that the officer would be
'•llling to purchase drugs Eran the Defendant, never contacted the officer on any
x:cas ion concerning the distribution of drugs. All contacts were initiated by the
officer.

The officer never found any drugs or observed any at the Defendant's

residence.

In fa:::t, when the substance of marijuana was actually purchased for

the officer by the Defendant, the purchase was accanplished through a third party
and the Defendant requested the officer to sell him a joint for his own use.

It

appears fran this evidence to be clear that the Defendant had no drugs in his
hane for either use or sale.
The present case also bears a striking simularity to that of State
vs. Soroushirn, 571 P.2d 1370.

In Soroushirn, the Defendant was charged

as is the Defendant in the present case, with felony distribution of marijuana
for 11alue.

The Soroushirn case also involved an undercover narcotics officer

who befriended a black student who in turn introduced the officer to the

Defendant.

l\s in the present case, the officer had no previous indication that

the appellant was an individual who YoDuld get involved in selling drugs.

In

the officer took the appellant to a place in town to which he had
been directed to and gave the appellant twenty ($20.00) Dollars and asked him to
wt

two
1,,1cls

f 1 >l

hags of mariju:ma.

The appellant went into the house and returned with

,md ae livered them to the officer.

Approximately eight days later,

lowing several requests in visits by the officer to the appellant, all

'lesiqnPc1 to obtain marijuana Eran the aopellant, the appellant again rode with

-'i-

the officer to the hane of the third party, received fortv ($40.nO) Dol lJr; , ,
the officer and bought tv.D bags of marijuana fran the third party which he
delivered to the officer.

Immediately following the purchase of the first tv.1J

bags, the officer convinced the appellant to obtain tv.D additional bags Eran the
same source immediately following the purchase of the first tv.D bags.

The

officer gave the appellant a couple of joints when appellant requested him to do

so.
The Court found, based upon the foregoing facts, that Soroushirn did not
distribute'the substance at all but that the substance belonge<l to the officer
and it was the officer who made the distribution.

The Court stated at 571

P.2d 1371:
What is wrong here is that the appellant din not distribute
the substance at all. It belonged to the officer and it was
the officer who gave t.'1e appellant a couple of ioints and
thereby made the distribution.
The Court was correct in holding that the appellant had been
entrapped. He manifested no indication of being in the
marijuana b.Jsiness; but at the importuning of the undercover
officer, did a::t as aided to buy Eran real seller. There is
nothing to suggest that the appellant v.Duld have ever dealt
in marijuana except at the instance of and for the benefit
of the officer.
Again, the instant case is not distinguishable Eran the foregoing
situation.

Defendant was introduced to the officer by a friend.

The officer

befreinded the Defendant by visiting at his hane and calling him on the
telephone.

The Defendant did a favor for the officer.

the officer and the drug was supplied by a third party.

The !lDney is supplie<I bv
The officer allowec1 t1c

Defendant to pinch the bag after being requested to sell the Defendant sane of
the substance, and the officer, prior to contacting the Defendant, had no
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',

it

, '"' 1

,,)r1

nr evirlence that the Defendant was engaged in the selling of

·11 lc>rl substances.

1'he only fact which distinguishes the tvio cases, is the

f'K:t that in the Soroushirn case the Defendant was induced into
marijuana on three different buys, tvio occuring on the same date whereas in the
present case, there was only one purchase of marijuana by the Defendant for the
officer.
Again, in State vs. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, at 504 this Court stated
as follows:
Fran the testirrony induced by the State, the evidence
establishes as a matter of law that Annette Stubbs induced
the ccmnission of the offense by methods creating a sulr
stantial risk that the offense would be camiitted by one
not otherwise ready to carrnit it. I t should be emphasised
Defendant engaged in conduct perscribed by statute and was
guilty of a crime. However, his conviction cannot stand
for the reason the statute condemns the conduct of the
State in inducing the crime, as a perversion of the proper
standards or crlministration of criminal law.
Based oo the facts and the cases cited above, the conviction of the
Defendant should be reversed by reason of his entrapnent by the undercover
officer.
POINI' II

THE EVIDEN'.:E DID ITTl' SUPPORI' A CXJNVICTION FDR DISTRIBITTION OF A
CDNI'roLLED SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE.
1'he Defendant was charged under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
-,H 37-8 (1) (a) (ii) with distributing a controlled substance for value.

Under

';ta Le vs. Soroushirn, supra, the Court found that in fact whether the money
was provided by the narcotics officer, the drug was delivered to the officer by
thp

Defendant and was the only participation by the Defendant was as an agent

-7-

for the officer, there had been no distrihution.

S71 P.2rl l

no

ar 1171

the trial of this matter, this Court '<as consirlerc><l the :ilxw'C'-ment L•)ne<l star:1 1_,
in connection with facts in a situation wher'C' the Defendant was also charged
with distribution of a controlled substance for value for substantiall1 similar
acts to those performed by Defendant in the present case.
Hicken,

Tn State vs.

number 18321, the Court upheld the decision of

the trial court which dismissed the information against the Defendant on the
grounds that the Defendant had not engaged in distribution of a controlled
substance for value but should have been charged with the violation of Section
58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) for arranging the sale of a =ntrolled substance for value.
The acts of the Defendant in the Hicken case were that when approached by the
undercover officer he called a third party and arranged the terms of the sale,

the price, took the officer to the location of the sale and was present when thE
drug was transferred for value.
Additionally, in State vs. Harris, 601 P.2d 922, the Court upheld a
caiviction of the Defendant for arranging the distribution and providing a
=ntrolled substance under circumstances similar to the present case and the
Hicken case.

In the Harris case, the Court stated as follows:

Defendant's second point, that the State failed to prove the
element of value, is directly contradicted by the evidence.
It is first pointed out that the Defendant himself did not
receive any cash for arranging the sale. Tt is clear that
this is not the intent of this statute. Were it otherwise,
the arranging of drug sales
be perfectly legal, so long
as it is done gratuitously. The aim of the law is to make the
arrangement of drug sales unlawful, whether they be profitable or not. So far as any claim that seller of the
substance does not receive value, this is directly contradicted by the testinony of the informant who stated on the
stand that he paid the twenty-five ($25.00) Dollars issued

-8-

: 11n by the Vernal City i:>olice in exchange for three bags

nf

11kl.r

ijuana.

8ase<:l en the foregoing cases, it is respectfully sutmitted that
'"'fendant's crime, if any, was in arranging the distribution of the controlled
substance for value under the arranging portion of the statute cited above,
rather than distributing a controlled substance for value.

Whereas in the

present case, the Defendant had no marijuana for sale, made no m::mey on the
sale, and acted as the intermediary between the officer and the actual dealer,
the State should have charged him under the arranging portion of the statute.
Therefore, his conviction for distribution for value should be reversed.
OJNCLUSION
The Defendant's conviction for the crime of distribution of a controlled
substance for value should be reversed in that the Court or the jury should have
found that the Defendant was entrapped into ccmnitting the acts which led to his
arrest and prosecution in this matter.

While the job and duties of an under-

cover police officer are difficult, there is a substantial danger that the
activities of the officer in attempting to induce bonefide drug dealers to sell
to him may also induce saneone who is not engaged in dealing but who is aware of

the availability of drugs to engage into activity which he 1>Uuld not otherwise
have done.

In this case, based on the evidence before the Court, it is

sutmi tted that the Defendant was not engaged in distributing controlled

S1Jbstances for value and that his involvement with the undercover police officer
"' tf;is
i r,

case was initiate<'l by the officer, developed by the officer, and created

rile uff icer.
Further, the activities of the Defendant aside fran the entrapnent issue

-9-

ccnstitute the crime, if any, of arranging the salP nf a

1""4 s"",,,t.·u-ie··

rather than a distribution for value of a contrnlle'l suhstance.

Tl1e DefPndant

cannot be convicted for distribution where his sole part ic ipat ion was arranging
the sale.
Based en the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests that his
ccnviction in this matter be reversed.
Respectfully suhnitted this

"')'/I_!, day of June, 1983.

MIGIAEL D. ESPLIN

,

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

CERI'IFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I delivered tv.D copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, DAVID
WILKINSON, at 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111
day of June, 1983.
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